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Introduction

Background
1.
The UK government is elaborating a modern industrial strategy. In January 2017, the authorities published a consultation report (green paper) with a view to develop an industrial strategy that would help to address long-term challenges facing the UK economy (HM Government, 2017) . The key objective is to boost productivity and living standards across the whole country, by stimulating investment and skills. The aim of the industrial strategy is threefold, to: i) build on existing strengths and extend excellence into the future, notably in sectors such as automotive, aerospace, financial and professional services, and creative industries; ii) close the gap between the UK's most productive companies, industries, places and people and the rest; and iii) make the UK one of the most competitive places in the world to start or grow a business, develop new industries which could possibly displace existing ones, and not to protect the position of the biggest incumbent firms.
Productivity and investment across UK regions, sectors and firms
2.
Aggregate investment is weak, but its regional distribution does not explain regional differences in productivity. The overall investment ratio was 17% of GDP in the United Kingdom in 2016, against around 21% of GDP in other G7 and OECD countries, which is consistent with subdued aggregate productivity since the global financial crisis. Yet, the least productive UK regions have had significantly higher investment ratios than the most productive regions over the last fifteen years ( Figure 1 ). This suggests that the sectoral composition of regions and the type of investment that they undertake are stronger determinants of regional productivity. In particular, services activities have a lower capital intensity and are well developed in the most productive regions of Greater London and South East England, which contrasts with more capital-intensive manufacturing activities which are more prominent in all other less productive regions (Figures 2 and 3) . Moreover, ensuring that the local workforce has relevant skills would help to make the most out of the existing capital stock and future investments. Further drivers of productivity, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, are related to infrastructure, density of consumers, network of subcontractors and cluster effects -the so-called "ecosystem" where enterprises are located.
3.
Goods-producing sectors tend to invest more than services-providing sectors, and R&D intensity is particularly sector-specific. Most goods sectors have investment ratios at or above 20% (except mining and utilities which are two highly capital-intensive sectors), nearly two times higher than the investment intensity of services sectors (Figure 4) . The finance and insurance has the lowest investment ratio despite being the most productive of all sectors (Figure 3 ), but the lack of firm-level data does not allow considering the sector for the empirical analysis. Some sectors invest significantly into intellectual property products − software and R&D −, which include ICT, car and other high-tech manufacturing, and chemical sectors. Spending on R&D is essential not only to invent but also to adopt the latest technologies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) . By contrast, the investment of transport and storage, construction, business services, and accommodation and food is mainly allocated into buildings. The sectoral investment intensity has been changing over time (Figures A1 to A3 in the Annex). For instance, since the global financial crisis the mining sector has invested heavily in buildings, the opposite of the business services sector. Current levels (in GBP thousand, current prices, 2014) of labour productivity are shown on the second line of the x-axis' label.
Regions are ranked in descending order of the level of labour productivity. 1. Data for labour productivity (i.e. gross value added (GVA) per worker) refer to 2014. Regions are ranked in descending order of their level of labour productivity. High-tech manufacturing refers to chemicals and chemical products (CE), basic pharmaceutical products and preparations (CF), computer, electronic and optical products (CI), electrical equipment (CJ), machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (CK), transport equipment (CL) based on SIC07 industry classification. Low-tech manufacturing refers to food products, beverages and tobacco (CA), textiles, wearing apparel and leather products (CB), wood and paper products and printing (CC), coke and refined petroleum products (CD), rubber and plastic products (CG), basic metals and metal products (CH), other manufacturing and repair (CM) based on SIC07 industry classification.
2.
Professional, scientific and technical activities and administrative and support service activities.
Source: ONS (2016), "Regional gross value added (income approach), UK: 1997 to 2015", Office for National Statistics, December; and OECD (2017), "Regional Economy", OECD Regional Statistics (database), July. Investment ratio refers to the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to gross value added and it is calculated in nominal terms. Machinery and equipment includes transport, other machinery and equipment and ICT equipment. Buildings exclude dwellings, but include other buildings and structures, and costs associated with the transfer of non-produced assets. Intellectual property products include software and research and development. Source: ONS (2016), "Annual gross fixed capital formation by Industry and Asset", Dataset, Office for National Statistics, September.
4.
The national best practice is not equally diffused across regions: the south of England stands out with a high percentage of its firms at the frontier while other regions have only a few of them. As in many OECD countries, there is a gap between the most productive UK firms -the "national frontier" -and all other businesses (Haldane, 2017; Berlingieri et al., 2017) . Such differences imply that the best practices, and the latest technologies and knowledge are not diffused easily across the economy (OECD, 2015a) . In Greater London, more than 8% of firms belong to the national frontier, which is significantly more than in all other regions ( Figure 5 ). A stronger regional presence at the national frontier is positively related to regional productivity ( Figure 6 ). Since geographical proximity is a key determinant of the catch up in productivity, the unequal regional distribution of top-performing firms could explain the Agriculture and food
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Cultivated assets Buildings Intellectual property products absence of convergence of the lagging regions that are further away from the south of England. In particular, a third of England's population lives in Greater London and South East England, while people's proximity increases the agglomeration effects of large cities by fostering highly productive knowledgebased activities (OECD, 2016 , Bartolini et al., 2016 . However, agglomeration effects outside the south of England are low in the United Kingdom compared to other OECD countries, as measured by the correlation between city size and city productivity (OECD, 2015b) . Thus, making second-tier cities more functional and better equipped to deliver urban amenities and services would be an important source of regional convergence. Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% in terms of productivity within each 2-digit sector. The share of frontier firms by region is calculated as the number of frontier firms in a region divided by the total number of firms in the region.
Source: Calculations based on the Orbis firm level data by Bureau van Dijk; and OECD (2017), "Regional Economy", OECD Regional Statistics (database), June. 
5.
There are large productivity gaps between the frontier and other firms in each sector. There is scope to improve productivity in all sectors as many firms fall behind the sectoral frontier ( Figure 7 ). The gap is the highest for business services and the lowest for low-tech manufacturing, which implies that the diffusion of innovation and knowledge is the weakest for the former sector and the greatest for the latter sector. Median productivity (in logarithmic scale) is shown on the second line of the x-axis' label. Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% in terms of productivity within each 2-digit sector.
Source: Calculations based on the Orbis firm level data by Bureau van Dijk
6.
Each region has its sectoral productivity leaders. The relative representation of frontier firms for the top three sectors for each region shows important differences in regional specialisation (Figure 8 ). On this metric, car manufacturing appears as the biggest strength of four regions (East of England, South West England, West Midlands and East Midlands) and chemicals in two other regions (South East England and North West England). Greater London is the only region where ICT and business services are in the top three sectors.
7.
Industrial specialisation is not constant. The sectoral strengths of regions have been evolving over time (Figure 9 ). Two out of three top performing sectors in Greater London, North West England, West Midlands, East Midlands and Wales are the same as two decades ago, and in some cases have become even more represented at the frontier (such as ICT and business services in Greater London). By contrast, the sectoral strengths of two lagging regions -Yorkshire and The Humber, and North East England -have been overhauled relative to the mid-1990s, shifting from sectors intensive in intellectual property products (car manufacturing and chemicals) to sectors that are much less so (agriculture and food, wholesale and retail trade, low-tech manufacturing, construction and utilities). Values above 1 mean that the region is more represented in the frontier in the given sector than the country average. The three sectors with highest values are shown for each region. Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% in terms of productivity within each 2-digit sector. Values above 1 mean that the region is more represented in the frontier in the given sector than the country average. The three sectors with highest values are shown for each region. Frontier firms are defined as the top 5% in terms of productivity within each 2-digit sector.
Source: Calculations based on the Orbis firm-level data by Bureau van Dijk.
Empirical assessment
Methodology and data
8.
The empirical approach estimates the impact of raising sector-level capital intensity on the firm-level productivity gap from the frontier. The idea behind this approach is twofold. First, higher capital intensity translates into higher labour productivity, independently of impacts on multi-factor productivity (MFP). Second, to the extent that MFP increases, productivity is also affected by new (Solow, 1960; Sakellaris and Wilson, 2002) . These two channels can facilitate the catch up of laggard firms. Developments at the frontier are more likely to be led by genuine innovations through multi-factor productivity increases, potentially even at the global level, and not primarily by raising the domestic capital stock. For this reason, the scope of the analysis is limited to the catch up with the national frontier, i.e. the best practice in terms of business productivity. Also, the analysis does not consider the role of human capital -skills -, although intangible capital is included in total capital, which has a strong skill component, related to R&D, for instance.
9.
The dependent variable is a firm-specific productivity gap as a function of changes in sector-level capital intensity. This productivity gap, , is defined as the difference between the sector-specific labour productivity frontier and the firm-specific labour productivity :
All variables are measured in logs, and s, r, i, t stand for sector, region, firm and year, respectively, and F denotes the productivity frontier. Labour productivity is measured as value added divided by the number of employees (hours worked are not available). Value added is computed as the sum of labour costs and gross operating profits. The productivity frontier is measured as in Andrews et al. (2016a) , i.e. the average productivity of firms in the top 5% of the productivity distribution within each detailed (2-digit) sector.
The productivity gap is regressed on the growth in sector-level capital intensity (capital per employee), Δ , conditional on firm-and year-specific fixed effects and , respectively:
The growth in the sector-level capital intensity is obtained as the employment-weighted firm-level capital intensity changes over three year periods to focus on medium-term changes rather than year-to-year ones.
To allow for differences across sectors for the estimated impacts, a richer variant of equation (2) is estimated, separately for each region r:
Finally, to allow for a potentially different impact of R&D spending, the capital intensity in equation (3) is replaced by R&D capital intensity, which is built up from firm-level capital to labour ratios by applying the R&D capital to total capital ratio from the Office for National Statistics at a sector-year level.
10.
Deficient and top performing firms are excluded from the estimation to narrow the focus of policy intervention. During the estimation, two groups of firms are excluded from the sample: i) the frontier firms -the firms with the highest level of productivity within each 2-digit sector (Andrews et al., 2016a ) -as these firms are well performing and do not require policy action; and ii) the zombie firmsfirms that are more than 10 years old but cannot cover interest payments from their operating profits for 3 consecutive years (Andrews et al., 2016b ) -as these firms are inefficient, could hold back productive resources and should not benefit from support measures that would raise their capital intensity.
11.
The estimation is done for thirteen sectors and twelve regions, with the policy experiment being a one percent increase in capital intensity. Regions are defined as NUTS1 level regions using the Orbis firm-level data that contains several hundred thousand annual financial accounts -income statements and balances sheets -for the period 1995-2014. Only unconsolidated accounts are retained, so as to avoid the potential lumping of activities across various geographical locations captured by consolidated accounts.
To the extent that unconsolidated accounts refer to a unit that is present only at a single location, this mitigates the risk of misallocating economic activities across regions due to companies stretching over several plants. Companies in the financial and insurance sector are omitted from the analysis due to lack of available data. Firms that show growth rates in either the capital stock or labour productivity that fall in the top and bottom 1% of the growth distribution are excluded to minimize the role of extreme changes that could potentially occur during mergers and acquisitions, spinoffs or other rare events which are outside the scope of the analysis.
12.
After the estimation phase, the sector-region productivity impacts of a one percent increase in capital intensity are calculated as follows:
where the inverse of the estimates for sector-region effects on the productivity gap ̂s r is obtained by running regression (3) (on the gap which contains productivity with a negative sign), and is the share of non-frontier and non-zombie firms in sector s and region r that policy is assumed to be able to affect through higher capital intensity.
13.
The regional aggregate effect is obtained as follows:
where employment weights, = / , are derived from the sector-region distribution of the Office for National Statistics and the relative productivity level of sector s in region r is compared to the regional average = − + 1, which captures the fact that a boost to a high productivity sector will have a larger impact on the regional aggregate.
Estimation results
14.
The estimation results reveal that in most sectors, the productivity gap narrows significantly after an increase in capital intensity, although there is a large variation across sectors and regions. The impacts have the expected negative sign and are significant in most services sectors (such as ICT and business services) and in most regions (Table A1 in the Annex). However, higher capital intensity does not always translate into a closure of the gap in some sectors (utilities, construction, accommodation and food, car manufacturing) or the effect is not statistically significant for most regions (agriculture and food). The likely explanation is that some of these sectors have already a high capital intensity (e.g. utilities -see Figure 4 ), reducing the need for additional increases to close the gap. Also, capital tends to be concentrated among a few highly productive firms (e.g. car manufacturing), hence more capital intensity would result in a growing gap between the frontier and the laggard firms. Since the purpose in this exercise is to reduce the productivity gap vis-à-vis the frontier, these sectors are left out from subsequent simulation.
15.
The greatest potential to increase productivity in most regions is by raising the capital intensity of services sectors. A one percent increase in the capital-to-labour ratio has a greater impact on labour productivity in services sectors than in goods sectors. In particular, the largest and most widespread impacts are in knowledge intensive services sectors -ICT and business services -and in the wholesale and retail trade sector, ranging between 0.25% and 1.2% across 7-8 regions (Figure 10 ). Increasing the capital intensity of the manufacturing sector, both in the low-tech and high-tech segments, is effective in fewer regions (3 to 4), with an impact of about 0.3-1% (Figure 11 ). The values are obtained using equation (4). The impacts are measured in percentages (approximated by changes in logarithms) and are ranked from the largest to the smallest impact. Only those sectors are shown where the estimated impacts are correctly signed and significant, and which represent a significant share of total regional employment. Yorkshire refers to Yorkshire and The Humber.
16.
Sector-and region-specific support for investment could be tailored to deliver the most "bang for the buck". The weakest regions in terms of productivity would benefit relatively more from investment in the services sectors than in the goods sectors. For instance, raising the capital-to-labour ratio in the wholesale and retail trade sector would boost Welsh productivity significantly more (consistent with the lowest productivity of this sector in the United Kingdom -see Figure 4 ), than doing so in the low-tech manufacturing and chemical sectors. In Northern Ireland, increasing the capital intensity of the ICT sector would be more effective than by expanding the capital intensity of the high-tech and low-tech manufacturing sector, for which estimated impacts are nevertheless sizeable. This result is consistent with the observation that the ICT sector has the weakest productivity in Northern Ireland (Figure 4) . 
17.
Cumulating sectoral impacts across regions shows that the least productive regions would tend to benefit the most from greater capital intensity. The overall regional productivity impacts are driven by a combination of sector-and region-specific effects: i) the estimated responsiveness of the sectoral productivity gaps to capital intensity in each region; ii) the share of firms that can be impacted; iii) the weight of the sectors; and iv) the relative productivity of sectors (equations 4 and 5). Taking all these determinants into account, Figure 12 shows the overall regional productivity effects of increasing capital intensity by one percent uniformly across the sectors where higher capital intensity is estimated to decrease the productivity gap (i.e. negative and significant coefficients in Table 1 ). The regional productivity impacts are the largest in four out of five least productive regions. Put differently, the weakest regions present a large number of sectors for which policy intervention would be effective in stimulating labour productivity. 
18.
More granular analysis of investment suggests that R&D spending could be effective in raising the productivity of the manufacturing sector in some regions. Focusing on R&D capital intensity ( Figure 13 ) would lead to more widespread productivity effects in manufacturing, especially in its low-tech segment, as R&D spending helps not only in creating new innovation, but also in adopting existing technology by firms below the technological frontier. Significant productivity impacts of R&D spending in manufacturing are also consistent with a large contribution of intellectual products in total investment (see Figure 4 , in particular high-tech and car manufacturing as well as chemicals). Northern Ireland appears the most responsive, in line with estimates for total capital intensity (Figure 11 ), but slightly less so than by raising the capital intensity of the wholesale and retail trade sector (Figure 10 ). For Yorkshire and The Humber, the estimated impacts are slightly larger than for the services sectors (Figure 10 ), which is corroborated by having the least productive manufacturing sector in this region (Figure 4) . The UK R&D tax credit appears effective (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2016) , which is promising for using this policy lever. 
19.
This analysis does not take into account spillovers across sectors, but recent evidence for the United Kingdom suggests that they are likely to be small for the manufacturing sector. Developing the sector of advanced manufacturing increases employment substantially, but it does not generate significant productivity effects in services in the same area (Lee and Clarke, 2017) . Therefore, the region where such advanced industries are located also requires an improvement in productivity of services to make an impact on the overall regional productivity, given the larger size that services represent relative to manufacturing. This highlights the importance of focusing on services sectors if greater regional productivity gains are to be achieved. On the other hand, there could be other economic benefits of greater industrial diversification which this study does not quantify, such as greater resilience to shocks or spillovers between goods and services sectors located in different regions.
20.
A strong focus on services would be consistent with the position of UK sectors in global value chains. Recent OECD work, focusing on so-called centrality measures to reflect the influence of sectors and countries within production networks (Criscuolo and Timmis, 2017) , has found that the United Kingdom has been losing its position as a central hub in global value chains for all segments of the manufacturing sector ( Figure 14 Centrality reflects the position in global value chains relative to all other country-industries in the network.
2.
Fabricated metal products exclude machinery and equipment.
Source: Criscuolo, C. and J. Timmis (2017) , "GVCs and centrality: mapping key hubs, spokes and the periphery", OECD Productivity Working Papers, forthcoming. Source: Criscuolo, C. and J. Timmis (2017) , "GVCs and centrality: mapping key hubs, spokes and the periphery", OECD Productivity Working Papers, forthcoming.
Conclusion
21.
This analysis suggests that investment support as part of the industrial strategy should be targeted at sectors and regions that are lagging behind and whose productivity would be the most responsive to higher capital intensity. UK firm-level evidence suggests that for most regions, knowledge intensive services (ICT and business services) appear the most promising, given the strong potential for spillovers from leading firms in these areas and the large weight of such activities in regional output, comparable to the weight of manufacturing activities. However, raising R&D intensity of the manufacturing sector would also deliver important productivity increases in the most lagging regions.
22.
Future work could seek to take account of further drivers of productivity, particularly the availability of skills and their matching to jobs (Adalet McGown and Andrews, 2015) , with regional jobto-job mobility being reduced by a low elasticity of housing supply. Moreover, the ecosystem of companies could also be investigated more explicitly, including the role of infrastructure, and the density of consumers and suppliers. Investment ratio refers to the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to gross value added and it is calculated in nominal terms. Machinery and equipment includes transport, other machinery and equipment and ICT equipment. Buildings include other buildings and structures, and costs associated with the transfer of non-produced assets, but exclude dwellings. Intellectual property products include software and research and development.
Source: ONS (2016), "Annual gross fixed capital formation by Industry and Asset", Dataset, Office for National Statistics, September. Investment ratio refers to the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to gross value added and it is calculated in nominal terms. Machinery and equipment includes transport, other machinery and equipment and ICT equipment. Buildings include other buildings and structures, and costs associated with the transfer of non-produced assets, but exclude dwellings. Intellectual property products include software and research and development.
Source: ONS (2016), "Annual gross fixed capital formation by Industry and Asset", Dataset, Office for National Statistics, September. 
